A great number of classical Sanskrit texts, most of them philosophical, refer to the Cārvākas or Lokāyatas (also Laukāyatikas, Lokāyatikas, Bārhaspatyas) who must have constituted a school of thought which has left us almost no literary documents. ey once possessed a Sūtra text and several commentaries thereon, for fragments have been preserved in the works of those who criticise them. In modern secondary literature the Cārvākas are usually referred to as "materialists", which is somewhat unfortunate. It is true that the Sūtra text (sometime called Bārhaspatya Sūtra) accepts as only principles (tattva) the four elements earth, water, re and air; yet the term "materialism" and its cognates evoke in the modern world associations which are not necessarily appropriate for this ancient school of thought.
"materialismo" e suas cognatas causam no mundo moderno associações que não são necesariamente apropriadas para esta antiga escola do pensamento. Brahims, Cārvākas, Vedic, Lokāyatas Ancient traditions of the Lokāyatas or Cārvākas (Laukāyatikas, Lokāyatikas, Bārhaspatyas) 2 way of thinking, developed greatly in the Vedic period, produced non-theist documents 3 specially dedicated to epistemology. e guiding principles were: rejection to all form of metaphysic truth and to accept only one way to know reality from the perception and other annexed processes like inference and/or analogy. In the majority of interpretations and modern comments, 4 they are located in the category of philosophical materialism; 5 nevertheless, this statement misrepresents the true content of these schools.
Palavras-chave:
For Marxist historians in particular, materialism is the opposite of idealism; the former is knowledge, the latter faith. 6 e latter kind of philosophers "worked in defence of obscurantism, irrationalism and scripture-mongering caste hatred"; the former were "struggling in their own way against the same ideological forces, though under limitations historically inevitable for them". 7 Idealism promotes faith, and faith is an instrument needed to maintain a society based on class antagonism and class exploitation. 8 Materialism does the opposite, and there is therefore a tendency among some of these historians to associate this philosophy with the less privileged layers of society. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya's study Lokāyata (1959) , for example, states in its introduction (p. xvii):
What then was the original Lokayata? ... Etymologically it means "that which is prevalent among the people" ... But the earliest of the available clues are hopelessly fragmentary and are too often embedded in mythological imagination. Nevertheless, a careful examination of some of these may give us a dim view of a primordial complex of a this-worldly outlook related to a body of ritual practices and the whole theme being somehow or other "prevalent" among the masses.
is "humble beginning", as he calls it, occupies much of Chattopadhyaya's book. One fears that the modern associations of the term materialism have pushed at least some research of the Cārvākas into a direction that may not be appropriate to it. 9 ere is another reason to be careful with the expression "materialism". It is far from certain that the emphasis of the Cārvāka philosophy was on the central role of the material elements. Among its other positions that are often cited in the texts is the rejection of what is called "another world", which in practice primarily means the rejection of rebirth and karmic retribution. e most often cited sūtra in this connection is: paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāva " ere is no other-world because of the absence of any other-worldly being (i.e., the transmigrating self)." 10 It shows that the rejection of the self was an element in the rejection of "another world". And the rejection of the self was based on the view that the normal characteristics of the self, most notably consciousness, derive directly from the elements, so that there is no need for a self.
11
Seen in this way we have to consider the possibility that the materialist construction served the ultimate aim of rejecting rebirth and karmic retribution, more than a love of materialism per se. is would put the Cārvākas in an altogether di erent perspective: their aim would in that case primarily be negative, and the point of view they were concerned to reject would not be idealism or some such position, but the belief in "another world". is change of emphasis nds support elsewhere. e Buddhists were concerned with the intellectual threat coming from the Cārvākas, not of course because they 2. Franco & Preisendanz (1998: 179) note: " ese terms seem to apply only to the followers, not to the school itself." Pārthasārathi's explanation of Kumārila's expression lokāyatīk tā (see below) suggests that lokāyata can be used as an adjective. K a Miśra's Prabodhacandrodaya has the line sarvathā lokāyatam eva śāstram yatra pratyak am eva pramā am (p. 76; Pédraglio, 1974: 154) ; here lokāyata appears to be a noun that applies to the school, even though an adjectival interpretation is not impossible. 3. Jayarāśi's Tattvopaplavasi ha "is the only text of the Lokāyata or Cārvāka school which has come down to us", yet "[i]t is clear that there are important philosophical di erences between Jayarāśi's views and what usually goes under the name of Lokāyata philosophy"; Franco, 1987: 3-4. 4 . For a very useful collection of fragments, see Bhattacharya, 2002. 5 . p thivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni; Bhattacharya, 2002: 603. 6 . Cf. Ruben, 1979 (Wissen gegen Glauben) 7. Chattopadhyaya, 1976 : vii-viii. 8. Chattopadhyaya, 1976 . According to the Bibliography of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, there even exists a recent book called Charvaka Darshan: Ancient Indian Dalit Philosophy (Rao, 1997 ) 10. Bhattacharya, 2002 . tebhyaś caitanyam; Bhattacharya, 2002: 604. denied the soul, but because they denied "another world". ey reacted by writing against this position, sometimes in independent treatises called Paralokasiddhi "Proof of another world / rebirth", or in sections of larger treatises.
12
Various Brahmanical authors, moreover, admit that their concern to prove the eternality of the soul has as ultimate aim to show that there is life after death.
13
ere is also an intriguing verse at the beginning of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika which reads:
14
For the most part Mīmā sā has, in this world, been turned into Lokāyata. is e ort of mine is made to take it to the path of the āstikas.
Ganga Nath Jha (1900: 2) e Bārhaspatya is the Bārhaspatya Sūtra, the classical text of the Cārvākas. Śīlā ka indicates here that there are all kinds of Brahmins, some of whom are Cārvākas. e implicit suggestion is that the Cārvākas are all, or most of them, Brahmins.
If this suggestion looks at rst surprising, a number of other factors support it. Jayarāśi, the author of the only surviving work (Tattvopaplavasi ha) of the Lokāyata or Cārvāka school that has come down to us, calls himself in the concluding verses bha aśrījayarāśidevaguru "guru Bha a Śrī Jayarāśi Deva".
20
Another teacher of the school is known as Bha a Udbha a. e honori c Bha a indicates that these two were Brahmins, 21 perhaps Brahmin householders.
22
To this can be added that two other Cārvāka authors, Aviddhakar a and Bhāvivikta, and perhaps also Udbha a, appear to have written Nyāya works as well.
23
Udbha a, moreover, was a grammarian in the Pā inian tradition besides being a Cārvāka, and perhaps also an Āla kārika.
24
All these teachers had therefore strong links to Brahmanical traditions.
Śīlā ka›s commentary has a further surprise in store. Under the immediately following verses of the Sūyaga a it discusses at length the positions of the Cārvākas. Most surprising is that under verse 11 it cites, in support of their position, a Vedic passage, B hadāra yaka Upani ad 2.4.12, which it calls "their scriptural authority" (tadāgama): 25 "For this is their scriptural authority: 'A single mass of perception, having arisen out of these elements, disappears after them: there is no awareness after death'".
12. See Steinkellner, 1984; 1985; 1986; Franco, 1997 . 13. Preisendanz (1994 Tucci, 1923-29: 96 n. 3. 16. is usage is quite common, especially among the Jainas; Haribhadra's a darśanasamuccaya v. 77, for example, refers collectively to the doctrines of Buddhists, Jainas, Sā khyas, Jainas, Vaiśe ikas and Mīmā sakas as āstikavāda "doctrines of the āstikas". He then moves on to the Lokāyatas, who are nāstikas. Note further that the Kāśikā on P. 4.4.60 (astināstidi a mati ), which accounts for the words āstika and nāstika in the senses "he who thinks 'there is'" and "he who thinks 'there is not'" respectively, adds (Kāś I p. 448): na ca matisattāmātre pratyaya i yate, ki tarhi, paraloko 'sti iti yasya mati sa āstika / tadviparīto nāstika /. 17. Pārthasārathi, Nyāyaratnākara p. 5: mīmā sā hi bhart mitrādibhir alokāyataiva satī lokāyatīk tā nityani iddhayor i āni a phala nāstītyādibahva pasiddhāntaparigrahe eti. Note that lokāyata is here used as an adjective. 18. Winternitz, GIL II p. 318. 19. Śīlā ka, Sūtrak tā gav tti, p. 9 (on Sūy 1.1.1.6: ege sama amāha ā): eke śrama ā śākyādayo bārhaspatyamatānusāri aś ca brāhma ā . 20. Jayarāśi, Tattvopaplavasi ha p. 125; Franco, 1987: 7. 21 . See Solomon, 1978 : 992. 22. See Slaje, 2007 . Franco, 1997: 142 , with references to Steinkellner, 1961, and Potter, 1977: 281, 338-340; further Solomon, 1978 : 990 f. 24. Solomon, 1978 Bronkhorst, 2008. 25 . Śīlā ka, Sūtrak tā gav tti, p. 14 (on Sūy 1.1.1.11): tathā hi tadāgama : vijñānaghana evaitebhyo bhūtebhya samutthāya tāny evānu vinaśyati na pretya sa jñāstīti.
Śīlā ka was not the only, nor indeed the rst one, to connect the Cārvākas with this particular Vedic passage. 26 e Āvaśyakaniryukti v. 600 speaks, in connection with the denial of the soul (jīva), of Vedic words that have been misunderstood (veyapayā a ya attha na yā asī, Skt. vedapadānā cārtha na jānāsi). Its commentator Haribhadra (eighth century) cites in this connection (p. 161-62) the same Upani adic passage and discusses it. Before him, in the sixth or seventh century, Jinabhadra does so in his Viśe āvaśyakabhā ya. He refers to this passage in his verse 2043, and cites it in full in his own commentary (p. 354). e commentator Ko yārya, commenting one or two centuries later 27 on Viśe āvaśyakabhā ya verses 2404-06, cites this passage to show that the Veda sometimes agrees that "the other world" does not exist.
28
Kumārila (seventh century) mentions in his Ślokavārttika someone "who concludes on the basis of the Veda that there is no self".
29
His commentator Pārthasārathi Miśra (eleventh century) cites here the same Upani adic passage.
30
Jayanta Bha a, who like Śīlā ka wrote towards the end of the ninth century, cites the passage in the context of a Lokāyatika opponent who thinks that one should stop wasting one's time talking about "another world".
31
Elsewhere in the same work Jayanta expresses his concern that this Upani adic passage might support the Lokāyata position.
32
At the end of the seventh Āhnika he returns once again to this Upani adic passage, connecting it with the pūrvapak a, and then refers to other passages from the same Upani ad according to which the self does not perish, and comments that that is the siddhānta.
33
Malayagiri, in his Āvaśyakaniryuktivivara a of the twelfth century, and the author of the Sarvadarśanasa graha 34 in the fourteenth, still connect the Cārvākas with this passage.
35
Recall at this point that according to Kumārila and Pārthasārathi the Mīmā sakas Bhart mitra and others had turned Mīmā sā into Lokāyata by accepting that there is no other world. is was presumably not very dicult. Śabara›s Bhā ya discusses the meaning of "heaven" (svarga) under sūtras 6.1.1-2 and comes to the conclusion that heaven is "happiness" (prīti), not "a thing characterised by happiness" (prītiviśi a dravya). e popular notion according to which heaven is a very agreeable place where one goes after death is discarded. Put di erently, in Śabara›s Mīmā sā the belief in "another world" is not at all obvious. Śabara›s Mīmā sā ignores everything that concerns rebirth and liberation; even its conception of heaven is compatible with a denial of life after death. Bhart mitra's explicit denial was therefore hardly a very revolutionary move within Mīmā sa. We should not of course conclude from this that Cārvāka thought was identical with the Mīmā sā of Śabara, Bhart mitra or others, but nor should we lose sight of the fact that the two have points in common.
At this point some serious questions have to be addressed. Aren't the Cārvākas the greatest critics of the Vedic tradition? Aren't they characterised by " erce opposition to the religious Weltanschauung which had sacri ces at its center"? Jayatilleke (1963: 69-70) , too, concludes from this that "Materialist philosophy emerged within the Brāhma ical fold". 35.
is is not the only Vedic passage that is connected with the Cārvākas. Sadānanda's Vedāntasāra (pp. 7-8) presents four di erent Cārvākas who invoke three passages from the Taittirīya Upani ad and one from the Chāndogya Upani ad to justify their respective positions. e fact that subsequently a Buddhist is introduced who justi es his position with another passage from the Taittirīya Upani ad shows that no historical conclusions should be drawn from this. Cf. Hillebrandt, 1916: 19 [347] ; Tucci, 1923-29: 118-19 A look at the Cārvāka fragments collected to date reveals the fact that most of them are found in works written between the eighth and twelfth centuries CE. Although Cārvāka studies really began after the publication of the editio princeps of [the Sarvadarśanasa graha], it should be noted that this digest rarely quotes any Cārvāka aphorism that can be taken as genuine. It only purports to give, both in prose and verse, the essence of the Cārvāka philosophy, not in the words of any Cārvāka author, but as the learned fourteenth-century Vedāntin understood it. Nor does he mention the name of a single Cārvāka work, text or commentary (which he does profusely while dealing with other philosophical systems in the same work). So it may be admitted that all Cārvāka works had disappeared from India even before Sāya amādhava's time.
37
is makes sense where the collection of fragments is concerned, but also in the reconstruction of the philosophy and, last but no least, in nding out what others thought of the Cārvākas. Authors after, say, the twelfth century had no direct knowledge of the Cārvākas and their ideas any more. ey felt free to attribute to them all manner of positions which they disapproved of. An inspection of the Cārvāka fragments collected by Bhattacharya shows that criticism of the Veda and its associated practices are virtually con ned to ślokas, most of which are only cited in the Sarvadarśanasa graha, a text which is no longer acquainted with the school; other are cited in other late works, or they are simply not connected with the Cārvākas, so that we have no grounds for assuming that Cārvākas in particular are meant.
38
None of the thirty extracts from the commentaries in his collection says anything against Vedic texts and practices. Of the eighteen sūtras collected two, according to Bhattacharya, deal with vedaprāmā yani edhavāda, the rejection of Vedic authority. However, both these sūtras (unlike most others) are ambiguous and do not need to concern the Veda at all.
39
What is more, they are only cited in Jayanta Bha a's Nyāyamañjarī, in a context which gives no hint as to their correct interpretation. 40 It seems likely that the anti-Vedic element came to be attributed to the Cārvākas later on, probably at a time when they were no longer around to show how inappropriate this was.
is gives rise to the following interesting question. Do more recent sources also attribute this philosophy to non-Brahmins, to lower strata of society? Unfortunately the evidence concerning the social position of the Cārvākas is scarce, both for the earlier and for the more recent period. But there is at least one passage that fully con rms this expectation. Gu aratna does not dare to say, it seems, that the Cārvākas could not possibly be Brahmins. Perhaps the tradition connecting the two was still too strong in his days. But he includes lower strata of society, down to the lowest (antyaja), and we may read between the lines that the Brahmins who accepted this philosophy were no better than Śūdras. We may conclude that in Gu aratna's time Cārvākas had become strawmen to whom one could attribute all that was reproachable and despicable.
37.
e appropriateness of the title of a recent work (Les matérialistes dans l'Inde ancienne; Ballanfat, 1997) , which doubts the authenticity of the early Cārvāka quotations, and bases itself almost exclusively on the Sarvadarśanasa graha, is therefore questionable. 38.
is may in particular be true of Śl. 2 in Bhattacharya's collection, which reads: agnihotra trayo vedās trida a bhasmagu hanam / buddhipauru ahīnānā jīviketi b haspati //. He translates: "B haspati says -e Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes, -(all these) are the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness." is verse is cited in Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarīgranthibha ga (ed. Shah p. 75), without any indication as to its origin. e name B haspati is no guarantee that Cārvākas are here meant: recall that the followers of B haspati are frequently referred to in the Arthaśāstra and elsewhere as thinkers who have certain views about politics and morality. e Arthaśāstra attributes to them the view that "Vedic lore is only a cloak for one conversant with the ways of the world"; see below. 39.
ey are dharmo na kārya and tad upadeśe u na pratyetavyam (or tadupadeśe u na pratyetavyam); Bhattacharya's translations ("Religious act is not to be performed" and "Its (religion's) instructions are not to be relied upon") preserve the ambiguity. 40. Jayanta Bha a, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya (1990: 266) translate: " e Nāstikas are a kind of people, including Brahmins and ending with the low-born, who carry human skulls, smear their bodies with ashes and practise yoga". is translation does no justice to the word ca "and".
It is hard to say with precision when this change of attitude towards the Cārvākas had taken place. It was already there in the second half of the eleventh century, at the time of K a Miśra, the author of the allegorical drama called Prabodhacandrodaya. 43 e Cārvāka in this drama cites several of the anti-Vedic ślokas 44 which also the Sarvadarśanasa graha associates with him. (It is however noteworthy that the Cārvāka in this play is a court philosopher and friend of the king, whereas the other heterodox doctrines appear in the form of ridiculous monks: a Jaina monk, a Buddhist monk, and a Kāpālika.
45
) Already before K a Miśra, Vācaspati Miśra 46 did not hesitate to call the Cārvākas inferior to animals (because more stupid than these), but this may not tell us much about their position in society according to this author.
We have come to think that the Lokāyata position was primarily the denial of "another world", without anti-Vedic overtones. We have even seen that Mīmā sā in one of its forms had been very close to this school of thought. All this has interesting implications. Most schools of Indian philosophy have the belief in rebirth and karmic retribution as a shared presupposition. is belief is common to practically all surviving schools, however much they may di er in other respects. is is noteworthy, for the oldest texts of Brahmanism, which together constitute the Veda, do not know this belief until their most recent parts. Some Brahmins adopted this belief in the late-Vedic period, with the result that it started nding expression in late-Vedic texts from the earliest Upani ads onward, but clearly not all Brahmins were convinced. Brahmanical orthodoxy as incorporated in the the Mīmā sā school of hermeneutics had not yet accepted this belief around the middle of the rst millennium of the Common Era and later. We can be sure that many other Brahmins, too, took centuries to adopt this way of looking at the world. It also seems likely that this process, which for some may have taken a thousand years or longer, was sometimes marked by discussions between those who did and those who did not accept this doctrine.
e Mīmā sā school of hermeneutics does not reject the doctrine in its classical text, the Śābara Bhā ya; it ignores it. It does not therefore participate in the debate which we assume may have taken place at its time. All the other philosophical schools of which texts survive accept this doctrine as if there were no problem. It looks as if only those Brahmins who accepted this doctrine participated in the philosophical debate, the single exception being the Mīmā sakas, who kept silent. What happened to all those other followers of the Vedic tradition who were in no hurry to open up to those completely non-Vedic ideas? Where they excluded from the discussion?
It is here, I suggest, that the Cārvākas and like-minded people t in. is suggestion implies, of course, that the Cārvākas were primarily Brahmins rather than representatives of the "lower classes". ese Brahmins resisted the encroachment of the new ideology of rebirth and karmic retribution with arguments of a materialistic nature. Rejecting the "other world" in the form of rebirth and karmic retribution, they had to abandon the belief in a Vedic heaven as well, because the same arguments cut both ways; however, this was no great sacri ce, for the "otherworldly" dimension of the heaven which is presumably brought about by the Vedic sacri ce was not strong. Since more and more Brahmin thinkers joined the other side in this debate (the side of rebirth and karmic retribution), the Cārvākas found themselves more and more isolated and in the end abandoned by all, including other Brahmins.
A review of earlier passages which criticise rebirth and karmic retribution does not add much to our conclusions so far. Criticism against this position is found in the Buddhist canon, even though not in connection with the expressions "Cārvāka" and "Lokāyata"; the latter of these two terms appears to be used in a di erent sens here.
47
But we nd an emphatic con rmation of the truth of this doctrine in the rst two of three "knowledges" which play a role in the enlightenment of the Buddha.
48
Denial of this doctrine is put in the mouth of a certain Ajita Keśakambalin in the Pāli canon, and is associated with other names in other versions of the canon.
49
Critics of the doctrine gure in one of the oldest texts of the (Śvetāśvara) Jaina canon. 50 en there is the story of king Pāyāsi or Paesi, preserved by the Buddhists and the Jainas respectively; 51 this king does 43. Pédraglio, 1974: 3 sq. 44. P. 77 sq.; Pédraglio, 1974 : 156 sq. 45. Pédraglio, 1974 . Note that Gu aratna's description of certain Lokāyatas as skull-bearing (kāpālika) contradicts K a Miśra's distinction between the Cārvāka and the Kāpālika. 46. Vācaspati Miśra, Bhāmatī, p. 766 (on 3.3.54): nāstikas tu paśor api paśur i āni asādhanam avidvān. Cp. Jayanta Bha a, Nyāyamañjarī, ed. Varadacharya, vol. I p. 317: tatrānumānasvarūpa cāśakyanihnavam eva, sarvalokaprasiddhatvāt/ abalābālagopālahālikapramukhā api / budhyante niyatād arthāt arthāntaram asa śayam //. Cf. Bhattacharya, 1999a : 490. 47. Rhys Davids, 1889 Franke, 1913: 19 n. 3; Bhattacharya, 1998; Franco & Preisendanz, 1998 : 178-179. 48. Bareau, 1963 Demiéville, 1927; Schopen, 1983 . 49. See MacQueen, 1984 1988: 152-153; Meisig, 1987: 124 . 50 . Sūy 1.1.1. 6-8; 11-12 (ed. tr. Bollée, 1977: 14, 15, 60, 64) ; 2.1.15 (tr. Jacobi, 1895: 339-40) 51. See Leumann, 1885; Bollée, 2002 not believe in existence after death.
52
A number of more recent texts, too, are acquainted with deniers of rebirth and karmic retribution, without mentioning the Lokāyata Sūtra in this context. Among these may be mentioned the Carakasa hitā, 53 certain passages in the Mahābhārata and in the Vi udharmottara Purā a (1.108.12-20); 54 this last case is particularly interesting, because the heretical position is here attributed to a lokāyatika king called Vena. In Āryaśūra›s Jātakamālā ch. 29 it is king A gadinna of Videha who believes that there is no "other world". In a passage from the La kāvatāra Sūtra the king of the Nāgas presents himself to the Buddha in the form of a Brahmin and states that there is no other world. 55 e Nyāya Sūtra provides arguments in support of former existences in sūtras 3.1. 18-26. 56 ese passages (to which others could be added) tell us very little about the social background of the critics of rebirth and karmic retribution: some say nothing whatsoever about their social identity, others attribute this critical attitude to a king, one to a king of the Nāgas who had adopted the appearance of a Brahmin. e repeated appearance of kings in these passages yet reminds us of the fact that kings played an important role in the cultural life of India, especially during the millennium or so from 500 BCE to 500 CE. Kings during this period had courts and capitals, and these courts and capitals attracted Brahmins, i.e., certain Brahmins. Urbanisation started (again, after the earlier Indus civilisation) around 500 BCE, ourished from 200 BCE onward, and continued until it started to decline under and after the Guptas from the middle of the rst millennium onward. 57 e attitude of traditional Brahmins with regard to cities was negative, as is well-known from literature. e Vedic Brahmins did not like cities, and preferred to live in the countryside, where they could preserve their ritual purity. Various Dharma Sūtras and other texts con rm this. e Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra, for example, states: "'A man who keeps himself well under control will attain nal bliss even if he lives in a city with his body covered with the city dust and his eyes and face coated with it' -now that is something impossible. which shows that the cities were there, but the Brahmins addressed in these texts did not like them.
ese rural Brahmins, we may assume, concentrated on their traditional rites, and ignored, or tried to ignore, the new ideas that were gaining ground.
But there were also Brahmins in the cities, where they aspired to positions such as that of purohita or councillor to the king, or engaged in other activities. ese were the Brahmins who wrote, and read, the Arthaśāstra, the Kāmasūtra, the courtly literature which has been preserved, and no doubt much else. Information about these urban Brahmins can be obtained from the Arthaśāstra. Kangle (1965: 144 f.) sums it up in the following words:
Special privileges are intended for [the Brahmin], particularly for a Śrotriya, that is, a Brahmin learned in the Vedas. It is recommended, for example, that land free from taxes and nes should be granted to a Śrotriya, just as such lands are to be granted to the priests and preceptors of the ruler (2.1.7). It is also laid down that the property of a Śrotriya, even when he dies without an heir, cannot escheat to the state like the property of other citizens (3.5.28). Brahmins in general are, it seems, to be exempted from payment at ferries and pickets (3.20.14). In many cases, punishment for o ences is made dependent on the var a of the o ender. In cases of abuse, defamation, assault etc., an ascending scale of nes is prescribed in accordance with the o ender's var a (Chapters 3.18 and 3.19). ... Discrimination on the basis of var a is referred to in connection with the oath to be administered to witnesses (3.11.34-37), in the matter of inheritance by sons born of wives belonging to di erent var as (3.6.17-20) and so on. Again, the var as are to occupy di erent residential areas in the city, the Brahmins in the north, the K atriyas in the east and so on (2.4.9-15). It is also laid down that 52. Bronkhorst, 2003 53. Carakasa hitā, Sūtrasthāna 11.6-33; cf. Meindersma, 1990; Filliozat, 1993; Preisendanz, 1994 : II: 307 . 54. Bhattacharya, 1999 Hopkins, 1901: 86 . 55 It is more than likely that the Arthaśāstra paints a far too attractive picture of the privileges of the Brahmins, but this is no doubt due to the fact that Brahmins were involved in trying to in uence public life at and around the royal court; they had to convince the king that it was his task to instal and maintain "the law laid down in the Vedic lore which is bene cial, as it prescribes the respective duties of the four var as and the four āśramas". 62 ey may or may not have obtained all the privileges they wanted, but the for us important fact is that they were there, at the courts and in the cities. ese were urban Brahmins, who should not be confused with those other Brahmins who stayed as far as possible from urban centres, in the countryside where they stuck to their Vedic traditions.
63
In view of the above it seems justi ed to distinguish for this period two kinds of Brahmins who may have been rather di erent from each other: the rural ones and the urban ones. e rural ones could, more than the urban ones, continue their traditional life styles, and remain relatively aloof from developments in the urban world.
e urban Brahmins, on the other hand, had to compete for the favours of the king, and stay au courant in various other ways. 64 ey might be cynical with regard to their Brahmanical status, but they could not give it up, because it was their main claim to privilege. 65 A remark in the Arthaśāstra, a text characterised by straight talk, may illustrate this. It speaks about the Bārhaspatyas (di erent, it seems, from the Cārvākas who also came to be known by that name), and says the following about them: It is clear from the context that the Bārhaspatyas do not accept "the science of the three Vedas" (trayī). But far from making an issue of this, they are of the opinion that "the Vedic lore is only a cloak for one conversant with the ways of the world" (sa vara amātra hi trayī lokayātrāvida[ ]).
67
As far as I can see, this can mean only one thing. ese Bārhaspatyas kept their convictions as to the real e cacy of the three Vedas to themselves, because they did not wish to lose the advantages which they derived from this knowledge. is implies, of course, that they were Brahmins, but cynical Brahmins. Not all Brahmins were Bārhaspatyas, to be sure, and not all were as cynical, we may presume. Yet this remark may give an impression of the attitude of at least some urban Brahmins.
ese urban Brahmins had to face the brunt of the onslaught of the new ideas of rebirth and karmic retribution, for the kingly courts, and the cities, were natural focal points for di erent ideologies to confront each other.
e life of these Brahmins may have left them little space for traditional rites, but they would not be able to ignore the confrontation with the new ideas about rebirth and karmic retribution. It is in the surroundings of the royal court, including the capital city, that we may have to look for Brahmins who took up the challenge and responded to it in a coordinated fashion. ey, or some of them, fought back. ey rejected the belief in rebirth, and the existence of "another world" in general. Sometimes they may have succeeded in convincing their king; in such cases their opponents might associate this for them heretical point of view with a king: Pāyāsi, Paesi, Vena, or someone else.
In the long run they did not however succeed, at least not in this particular respect. As Brahmins they succeeded in gaining the social dominance which came to characterise future centuries almost throughout the subcontinent.
e battle against the doctrine of rebirth and karmic retribution, on the other hand, they lost. Later centuries would depict the early defenders of the Vedic tradition against this onslaught as being themselves critics of the Vedic tradition. e Cārvākas would turn in their graves if they knew.
